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Ashkan Sadeghi-Mobarakeh , Student Member, IEEE, and Hamed Mohsenian-Rad , Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—This letter investigates the fundamental differences
between how California Independent System Operator (ISO) and
Midcontinent ISO calculate performance accuracy scores in their
performance-based regulation markets. Both ISOs tend to follow
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission order 755 to pay regu-
lation resources—whether conventional generators or distributed
and demand side resources—based on their actual performance.
The advantages and disadvantages of each method are systemat-
ically explained. First, real-world ISO data are used to show that
there may exist major differences between these two methods in
scoring accuracy under similar regulation performance scenar-
ios. Next, the root causes for the observed differences are studied
mathematically. Finally, some suggestions are made to improve
these scoring methods; should these or other ISOs seek to refine
their scoring formulas.
Index Terms—Performance-based regulation market, perfor-
mance score, mileage, California ISO, Mid-continent ISO.
I. INTRODUCTION
F EDERAL Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 755requires Independent System Operators to develop pay-for-
performance protocols in regulation markets to compensate reg-
ulation resources based on their actual performance. Such a pay-
ment, a.k.a, mileage payment, must reflect the regulation resource’s
speed and accuracy in following the Automatic Generation Control
(AGC) dispatch regulation signal [1]. The goal is to compensate
fast-response resources, such as aggregated and autonomous de-
mand side resources, including electric vehicles, or batteries, based
on their actual values.
California ISO (CAISO) and Midcontinent ISO (MISO) have
both adopted this new market mechanism. They both calculate the
mileage payment as a product of three terms:{
Mileage
Payment
}
=
{
Actual
Mileage
}
×
{
Mileage
Price
}
×
{
Performance
Score
}
. (1)
The actual mileage is the up/down actual movement of the resource
to follow the AGC dispatch signal. The mileage price is determined
by the market. The performance score is a coefficient that evaluates
the performance of the resource in terms of following the AGC dis-
patch signal. The last item, i.e., the performance score, is the matter
of our focus in this letter because it is a key factor in implementing
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FERC Order 755 to reward resources based on their performance
[2].
CAISO and MISO use different formulations for their per-
formance score. Each ISO has its own considerations for its
choice. Our focus is not on questioning the metrics used by
these two ISOs. Instead, we seek to understand how these two
metrics result in different implications. Our study is motivated
by some recent ISO reports that raise concerns about their
own performance scoring methods. For example, as noted in
[3, p. 12], CAISO is interested in refining its scoring method based
on comparisons with other ISOs: “The CAISO reviewed different
methods for accounting for accuracy used by other independent
system operators and regional transmission operators in their Order
755 market designs. Alternative approaches adopted by the Mid-
continent Independent System Operator (MISO), the New York
Independent System Operator (NYISO) and PJM Interconnection
may provide some guidance on how to refine the ISOs performance
metric.”
The contributions in this letter are as follows:
1) A systematic approach is taken to compare the performance
scoring methods used by CAISO and MISO and to identify
the advantages/disadvantages of each method.
2) By using real-world ISO data, it is shown that these two
methods may result in significantly different scores for simi-
lar regulation performance scenarios.
3) Our study required doing a detailed mathematical analysis of
the MISO performance accuracy score, which to the best of
our knowledge, is done for the first time.
4) Some recommendations are made to refine and possibly im-
prove these two performance scoring methods.
II. TWO PERFORMANCE SCORING METHODS
The performance score in CAISO is a number between 0 and
1, which we denote by PSCAISO. It is calculated once for each
market interval that takes 15 minutes. The method of calculation is
explained in [4]. Mathematically, we can write:
PSCAISO =
[
1 −
∑T
τ =1 | s[τ ]− y[τ ] |∑T
τ =1 s[τ ]
]+
, (2)
where at each time slot τ of length four seconds, s[τ ] and y[τ ] de-
note the AGC setpoint and the mechanical output of the regulation
resource. The fraction in (2) is a normalized measure of perfor-
mance inaccuracy in following the AGC setpoints. Thus, 1 minus
the fraction is used to obtain a performance accuracy measure.
Note that, [x]+ = max{0, x}; and T = 15 × 60/4 = 225 denotes
the number of time slots.
The performance score in MISO is also a number between 0
and 1. We denote it by PSMISO. It is calculated once for each mar-
ket interval that takes five minutes. The AGC setpoints are sent
once every four seconds. MISO first calculates the actual response,
which is the accumulation of changes in the output of the resource
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Fig. 1. Performance scores of the real-world ISO regulation data in [6].
in response to the AGC setpoints, where a positive value indicates
a move towards the AGC setpoint and a negative value indicates
a move away from the AGC setpoint. The expected mileage is
the desired movement towards the AGC setpoints starting at the
mechanical output of the resource at the beginning of the market
interval [5]. We can write:
PSMISO =
[∑T
τ =1 | s[τ ]− y[τ − 1] |−| s[τ ]− y[τ ] |∑T
τ =1 | s[τ ]− s[τ − 1] |
]+
, (3)
where s[0] = y[0]. Note that, the model in (3) does not consider the
ramp constraints. Adding the ramp constraints does not change the
main conclusions in this letter; it only unnecessarily complicates the
notations and equations. To consider the ramp limits, one should
change the term inside the summation in the denominator in (3)
to |s[τ ]− r[τ − 1]| − |s[τ ]− r[τ ]|, where r[τ ] is the ramp setpoint
and r[0] = y[0]. Also note that, MISO does not distinguish the reg-
ulation mileage and energy mileage as far as the performance score
is concerned [5]. However, since our focus here is on performance
scoring methods of MISO and CAISO, we do not discuss this issue.
In (2) and (3), the error, i.e., the distance from AGC signal, and
the movements towards AGC setpoints at each four seconds interval
are the measures for evaluating a good resource, respectively. Next,
we follow the same philosophy in evaluating the performance scores
used by each of the ISOs.
III. COMPARISON OF THE TWO METHODS
Consider the real-world ISO data in [6], comprising AGC set-
points and mechanical outputs of a regulation resource. Fig. 1 com-
pares the corresponding PSCAISO and PSMISO. Sixteen market inter-
vals, each taking 15 minutes, are analyzed. Each time slot takes four
seconds. We can see that the performance scores are very different.
At certain intervals, such as 16:00–16:15 and 16:30–16:45, the two
scores are contradictory, where one score is 0% and the other one
is almost 100%.
Next, we study four additional representative test cases, as shown
in Fig. 2. Each market interval takes 20 seconds. The performance
scores are given in Table I. In Cases 1–3, two resources with outputs
y1 [τ ] and y2 [τ ] tend to follow the same AGC signal s[τ ]. In Case 4,
y1 [τ ] follows s1 [τ ] and y2 [τ ] follows s2 [τ ]. The regulation resource
output y could be from a conventional generation or a distributed
resources, such as aggregated and autonomous demand response
units [7]. In Case 1, both resources make equal absolute errors.
Thus, PSCAISO is the same for both resources. However, Resource 1
always moves in the direction of the AGC signal while Resource 2
moves in the opposite direction of the AGC signal. Hence, PSMISO
rewards Resource 1 and penalizes Resource 2.
In Case 2, Resource 1 does not follow the AGC signal, ex-
cept until the last time slot. Resource 2 does follow the AGC
signal, except in the last time slot. While PSCAISO is higher for
Resource 2, PSMISO is drastically lower for Resource 2.
Fig. 2. Four case studies to study performance scores, where T = 5.
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE SCORES FOR THE FOUR CASES IN FIG. 2
In Case 3, Resource 2 makes large errors when following the
AGC setpoints and thus PSCAISO favors Resource 1. However,
PSMISO favors Resource 2. Interestingly, similar patterns can be
seen in Fig. 1. The total error is higher yet the MISO score is larger
in interval 14:00–14:15 than interval 14:15–14:30.
In Case 4, we have y1 [τ ] = y2 [τ ] + 5 MW and s1 [τ ] = s2 [τ ] + 5
MW. Thus, the relativeness of y1 [τ ] to s1 [τ ] is the same as the
relativeness of y2 [τ ] to s2 [τ ]. Assuming that the ramp rates are the
same, the two resources perform similarly in following the AGC
signal. They also create equal total regulation errors, at 8 MW.
However, PSCAISO is very different for the two resources. PSCAISO
is very sensitive to the magnitude of the AGC setpoints. PSMISO is
reasonably similar for both resources. This is because the magnitude
of the AGC setpoints forms a bias in the denominator in (2), even
if the mileage values are exactly the same as for both resources.
IV. UNDERLYING CAUSES IN CASES 2 AND 3
The following Theorem is used to explain Cases 2 and 3.
Theorem 1: The numerator in (3), i.e., the so-called actual
movement, can be written in the following equivalent form:
T∑
τ =1
∣∣∣ s[τ ]− s[τ − 1] ∣∣∣− 2 ∑
τ ∈Ψ
∣∣∣ s[τ ]− s[τ − 1] ∣∣∣
− 2
∑
τ ∈Φ
∣∣∣ s[τ − 1]− y[τ − 1]
∣∣∣−
∣∣∣ s[T ]− y[T ]
∣∣∣, (4)
where Φ is the set of all time slots τ = 1, . . . , T such that either
s[τ ] ≥ y[τ − 1] > s[τ − 1] or s[τ ] ≤ y[τ − 1] < s[τ − 1]. Ψ is the
set of all time slots such that either y[τ − 1] > s[τ ] > s[τ − 1] or
y[τ − 1] < s[τ ] < s[τ − 1]. The set of all those time slots that do
not belong to Φ and Ψ is defined by Ω.
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Proof: After adding and subtracting s[τ − 1], we can rewrite
the first term in the numerator in (3) as follows:
T∑
τ =1
∣∣∣ s[τ ]− s[τ − 1] + s[τ − 1]− y[τ − 1]
∣∣∣
=
∑
τ ∈Φ
∣∣∣ s[τ ]− s[τ − 1]
∣∣∣−
∣∣∣ s[τ − 1]− y[τ − 1]
∣∣∣
+
∑
τ ∈Ψ
∣∣∣ s[τ − 1]− y[τ − 1] ∣∣∣− ∣∣∣ s[τ ]− s[τ − 1] ∣∣∣
+
∑
τ ∈Ω
∣∣∣ s[τ − 1]− y[τ − 1]
∣∣∣ +
∣∣∣ s[τ ]− s[τ − 1]
∣∣∣, (5)
We can rewrite the second term in (3) as
T −1∑
τ =0
∣∣∣ s[τ ]− y[τ ]
∣∣∣−
∣∣∣ s[0]− y[0]
∣∣∣ +
∣∣∣ s[T ]− y[T ]
∣∣∣
=
T∑
τ =1
∣∣∣ s[τ − 1]− y[τ − 1] ∣∣∣ +
∣∣∣ s[T ]− y[T ] ∣∣∣,
(6)
where we used the fact that s[0] = y[0]. By subtracting (6) from
(5), we can rewrite the numerator in (3) as (4).
One can use the same methodology as in the above proof and
go through similar but unnecessarily more complex equations, so
as to expand Theorem 1 to the case with the presence of the ramp
constraints. The conclusions will remain the same. Next, we explain
the implications of the results in Theorem 1.
On one hand, the first term in (4) in Theorem 1 does not in
any way depend on the generation output of the resources. It is,
in fact, equal to the denominator in (3). On the other hand, given
the negative signs of the other three terms, they all act as penalty
factors in calculating the performance score. The first penalty term
is impacted by the generation output of the resource only through
set Ψ. The second penalty term is impacted by the generation output
of the resource through not only set Φ but also the amount of the
absolute regulation errors inside the summation. Note that, if τ ∈ Φ,
then this penalty term is counted twice for time slot [τ − 1]. The
last term is the absolute regulation error at the terminal time slot
τ = T . We can see that the penalty terms for any τ ≤ T may be
double counted if it belongs to sets Ψ and Φ. They may also be
simply ignored if they belong to set Ω for all τ < T .
In Case 2, we have Φ = {}, Ψ = {}, Ω = {1,2,3,4,5} for Re-
sources 1, and 2. Thus, the performance of the resources at time
slots 1–4 are not considered by MISO. Here, MISO ignores the
better performance of Resource 2 at time slots 2–4. But it does
consider the better performance of Resource 1 at the time slot 5.
Thus, MISO drastically favors Resource 1.
In Case 3, Φ = {5}, Ψ = {3,4}, Ω = {1,2} for both resources.
The performance of the resources at time slots 1 and 2 are not con-
sidered by MISO. Further, MISO ignores the errors of the resources
at time slots 3 and 4. Instead it penalizes them based on the penalty
factor of mileage, i.e., the first penalty factor in (4). Finally, the error
at time slot 4 is double counted; because Φ = {5}. Thus, the better
performance of Resource 1 at time slots 2 and 3 is neglected and the
better performance of Resource 2 at time slot 4 is counted twice.
V. RECOMMENDED MODEL REFINEMENTS
It appears that a “good resource” is defined by CAISO as one that
shows low absolute errors in following AGC setpoints at individual
time slots; and by MISO as one that moves towards the AGC
setpoints across consecutive time slots. It is hard to argue which
approach is better. Nevertheless, it is observed that some very small
refinements may improve each metric. For example, we may refine
the metric of CAISO as:
PSRevisedCAISO =
[
1 −
∑T
τ =1 | s[τ ]− y[τ ] |∑T
τ =1 |s[τ ]− y[0]|
]+
, (7)
where we simply replace s[τ ] inside the summation in the denomi-
nator in (2) by |s[τ ]− y[0]|, somewhat similar to in (3). The revised
metric is no longer too sensitive to the magnitude of the AGC sig-
nal; thus, the issue in Case 4 is resolved, where PSCAISO changes to
0.34 for both Resources 1 and 2.
As for the concerns with MISO’s performance score in Case 2,
the term inside the summation in the denominator in (3) can be
replaced with |s[τ ]− y[τ − 1]|, as follows:
PSRevisedMISO =
[
1 −
∑T
τ =1 | s[τ ]− y[τ ] |∑T
τ =1 | s[τ ]− y[τ − 1] |
]+
. (8)
In such case, the ideal movement is recalculated at each four sec-
onds interval. As a result, the ideal movement is no longer totally
independent of the resource movement at each four seconds. PSMISO
now changes from 1 to 0.25 in Case 2.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The different approaches taken by CAISO and MISO to set
forth their performance scores is a fact stemming from CAISO
and MISO being different markets, with different levels of demand
for regulation, etc. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the
different implications of these two different practical approaches
and the root causes for such implications. This open problem was
addressed in this letter. We showed that at least some of the issues
that exist in practice, as raised by ISOs, come directly and provably
from the core formulations of the performance metrics used by the
ISOs. Thus, some refinements are recommended on each metric.
Of course, it is ultimately up to the ISOs to decide whether to keep
or refine their existing methods or adopt a new method. The math-
ematical models developed in this letter for performance scoring
methods can be used also for broader analysis of the CAISO and
MISO markets; such as to study how different resources may strate-
gically respond to these scoring methods; as well as the impact on
the overall market effectiveness under various physical and virtual
bidding scenarios.
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